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AGENCY CHARACTER AND THE CHARACTER
OF AGENCY GUIDELINES: AN HISTORICAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
HILLARY GREENE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Though antitrust guidelines have become commonplace, their
approach was novel when first introduced. In a 1964 front-page article
entitled, Industries Will Get Merger Guidelines, The New York Times observed,
"An entirely new approach to the enforcement of the antitrust laws is
about to be attempted by the Federal Trade Commission." ' Similarly, the
American Bar Association's 1968 Antitrust Developments treatise described
these first antitrust agency guidelines as "a new method to advise business-
men" about how the FTC would gauge the competitiveness of mergers.2
In the nearly forty years since the introduction of the first merger
guidelines, the federal antitrust agencies have issued numerous addi-
tional guidelines. Nearly all of those promulgated or revised over the
last decade and a half have been joint efforts between the FTC and the
U.S. Department of Justice. However, the agencies' respective entrances
into this policymaking realm were not only separate but also distinctive.
This essay explores the FTC's evolving approach to antitrust guidelines,
beginning with an overview of the general context in which the FTC
* Visiting Researcher, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to James Hurwitz, Tara Isa
Koslov, and Marc Winerman for valuable comments and input.
Eileen Shanahan, Industries Will Get Merger Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1964, at 1.
2 ABA SECTION or ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968 at 242
(1968). Technically, the FTC promulgated its first antitrust guidelines when it extended
its practice of issuing consumer protection guides, which addressed deceptive advertising
to encompass advertising allowances. These guides "spelled out in layman's language the
general prohibitions of sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the R[obinson]-P[atman] Act." FEDERAL
TRADE COMM'N, 1960 ANNUAL REPORT 2. These guides, now commonly known as the
Fred Meyer Guides, 16 C.F.R. 240.1, have been revised and remain in effect. See generally
Donald S. Clark, The Robinson-Patman Act: Annual Update, Remarks Before the ABA
Section of Antitrust Law 17-20 (Apr. 2, 1998). This essay will address only those guidelines
pertaining to the Sherman Act §§ 1-2 and Clayton Act § 7, to which most of the agency
effort regarding guidelines has been devoted.
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first introduced guidelines as an antitrust policy tool. The FTC's merger
guidelines can be roughly divided into three successive waves: industry-
specific; general; and jointly promulgated with the DOJ. What emerges
is a picture of guidelines as a dynamic institution along many dimensions,
including content, form, and manner of promulgation. This essay
explores some of the FTC's unique institutional features that likely con-
tributed to the particular contours of the agency's various guidelines.
II. GUIDELINES AS A POLICY TOOL
The FTC's incorporation of antitrust guidelines into its enforcement
repertoire constituted a new approach to an old problem: the high
degree of uncertainty that was perceived to characterize antitrust law.
This criticism had been dramatically leveled by Professor Derek Bok in
1960, when he described the relevant considerations in antitrust analysis
as "a dizzying array of factors."' A related criticism was issued by U.S.
Supreme CourtJustice Potter Stewart in his famous Von's Grocery dissent,
where he noted that the only consistency he could discern in antitrust
was that "the government always wins." 4 Certainty would not be forthcom-
ing in the form of legislation, as the antitrust laws had proven to be
largely resistant to clarifying 2Cmendments. 5 Rather, guidelines would
partially fulfill that role.
A. GUIDELINES DEFINED
Neither the Congress nor the antitrust agencies have formally defined
"guidelines" per se. As a practical matter, agency guidelines are nonbind-
ing public statements of enforcement policy. Guidelines articulate how
and why the FFC navigates the legal discretion available to it and, in so
doing, provide both a degree of direction to agency staff and a degree
of predictability to the public. This function is particularly important
given the "open texture" of antitrust law. 6 In light of the generality
of the antitrust statutes, antitrust law relies heavily upon common law
development as well as the prosecutorial discretion of the enforce-
ment agencies. 7
3 Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
HARV. L. Riv. 226, 256 (1960).
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Thomas E. Kauper, The Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to
Study the Antitrust Laws: A Retrospective, 100 MicH. L. REv. 1867, 1888 (2002) (noting
Congressional reluctance to amend the Sherman Antitrust Act, which had "achieved a
virtual icon status.").
" William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms,
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 470 (2003).
7 Id.
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Antitrust guidelines were first promulgated during the tenure of FTC
Chairman Paul Rand Dixon (1961-1969). Dixon's interest in this policy
tool reflected his "deep concern with expanding [the FTC's] function
to guide businessmen away from illegal methods of competition, rather
than simply to exert the menace of the law against transgressors."8 "Such
a guidance role for the Commission," Dixon correctly believed, "was
envisioned by President Woodrow Wilson and the Congress in creating
the Commission in 1914." 9
B. GUIDELINES AND LITIGATION
Antitrust guidelines supplement litigation. The perceived need for
guidelines arose, to some degree, from a recognition of the limitations
of litigation as a policy articulation device, and a sense that further
elaboration was needed. According to Commissioner Philip Elman, an
important driving force behind the FTC's early guideline efforts, individ-
ual adjudicative proceedings were an inadequate tool for developing the
"solid foundation of fact finding concerning particular markets and
industries" necessary to articulate specific legal standards.10 Elman noted
that the shortcomings of litigation pertained not only to efficiency but
also to equity concerns. "The crucial inferences required in a merger
proceeding-which are really in the nature of prophecies as to future
competitive conditions and effects-are unlike those which a judge is
ordinarily required to draw; neither he nor the counsel in a single
litigation should be asked to assume so large a burden of inquiry and
judgment."'"
Guidelines were expected to enable the agencies to transcend the case
law on substance as well as speed of review. As Elman observed, "Where
controlling legal principles have not yet crystallized ... [guidelines] may
often provide a useful alternative or supplement to the traditional case-
by-case adjudicative approach as a method of formulating legal doctrines
and standards." 12 Similarly, Willard Mueller, then the Director of the
FTC's Bureau of Economics, opined that spelling out the law "more
clearly than is presently the case ... could be done either legislatively
or by issuing an enforcement policy statement.... I fear the case-by-
case approach, one that begins by bringing a few cases for the purpose
8 FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, 1962 ANNUAL REPORT 1-2.
9 Id. at 2.
10 Philip Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 HARv.
L. REv. 385, 386 (1964).
11 Id. at 389.
12 Id. at 390-91.
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of creating precedents, will never do the job."13 Guidelines arguably
would have the virtue of providing more understandable, more compre-
hensive, and more timely direction compared to litigation alone-which,
by its nature, would always be inherently bound to the facts of individual
cases, and also would take longer to resolve. By setting forth a clearer
and faster articulation of policy, guidelines would serve as a valuable
tool to enhance business decision making.
Such reliance on guidelines was not, however, without critics. Within
six months of the 1965 arrival of Donald Turner, a proponent of merger
guidelines, as Assistant Attorney General of the DOJ Antitrust Division,
two top DOJ antitrust aides quit their jobs. They were "said to believe
that the only effective way to establish antitrust policy is to file and litigate
cases." 4 Time has proven such concerns regarding guideline efficacy to
have been largely misplaced; however, reasonable minds still may differ
regarding the desirability of all the effects of guidelines.
III. INDUSTRY GUIDELINES
The F-TC's first merger guidelines were industry-specific. As described
below, the model followed by the FTC likely was attributable to several
unique features of the agency, including its institutional mandate. In
contrast, the DOJ's first merger guidelines, which were largely contempo-
raneous with the FTC's, followed an alternative model.
A. FTC: INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC GUIDANCE
Professor Edwin Zimmerman, writing in 1964, noted that, "Over the
years the Commission has experimented with industry-wide trade practice
conferences, industry guides, [and] trade regulation rules .... -15 The
provision of such "industry-wide regulation guidance" was unique to
the Commission. 16 Consistent with that approach, the FTC's guidelines
applicable to mergers focused initially on the cement (1967) and food
13 Willard F. Mueller, Antitrust Policy and the Market Economy: An Interview, 3(2) ANTITRUST
L. & EcON. REv. 37, 69 (1969-70). See also Philip Elman, The Need for Certainty and Predictabil-
ity in the Application of the Merger Law, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 613, 621 (1965) ("The common
law method of inclusion and exclusion-the painstaking extraction of a legal principle
from a long series of individual decisions-may simply be too slow and cumbersome to
produce specific and clear standards...").
14 Fred P. Graham, 2 Top Aides Quit Antitrust Posts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1965, at 1, 63.
During interviews conducted the day Turner was sworn in, he stated that guidelines were
"a continuing process to clarify the law and bring a more orderly development." U.S. Seeks
to Map Antitrust Guides, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1965, at 21.
15 Edwin M. Zimmerman, The Federal Trade Commission and Mergers, 64 COLUM. L. REv.
500, 508 (1964).
16 Id.
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distribution (1967) industries. Guidelines for grocery products manufac-
turing (1968), textile mill products (1968), and the dairy industry (1977),
followed. While these industries were disparate, each industry had experi-
enced considerable consolidation, to which the merger guidelines were
a response. The guidelines clarified the FTC's enforcement policy, with
an express goal of reducing mergers within select industries.
Commissioner Elman succinctly presented the rationale underlying
industry-specific guidelines when he advocated their use in a 1964 adjudi-
cative opinion regarding a cement merger: "Where a problem involves
an entire industry made up of a large number of firms, it may be uneco-
nomical, inefficient, and inequitable to proceed exclusively on the basis
of individual adjudicative proceedings. Industry-wide problems require,
so far as is practicable, industry-wide solutions." 7 Elsewhere, Elman fur-
ther elaborated that the FTC approach emphasized "the development
of concrete factual standards" rather than more general "articulation of
general rules and controlling legal principles .... ,,18
Though variations existed, each of these early sets of guidelines con-
tained highly fact-specific criteria regarding key legal issues, including
concentration levels and trends, market definition, and entry. For exam-
ple, the cement industry guidelines stated that "concrete is normally not
transported more than five to ten miles from the production site ... "
and concluded that "[a]ny given metropolitan area would therefore
appear to be a definitive market for concrete production." 19
Another feature shared by several industry guidelines was a premerger
notification requirement. Pursuant to its Section 6(b) authority under
the FTC Act,20 the Commission required firms above certain size thresh-
olds to notify the Commission at least sixty days prior to any acquisition.
Each year the FTC notified firms affected by this requirement that they
would need to "file special reports" (a novel use of special report authority
preceding adoption of the Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification
regime). 21 Several years after promulgating these industry guides, the
FTC ultimately required premerger notification across all industries for
17 Permanente Cement Co., 65 F.T.C. 410, 494 (1964).
18 Elman, Rulemaking Procedures, supra note 10, at 388.
I9 Federal Trade Comm'n, Enforcement Policy with Respect to Vertical Mergers in the
Cement Industry, reprinted in 289 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) X-1 (Jan. 24, 1967).
20 Section 6(b) empowers the FTC to require corporations to file written reports in
response to specific questions.
21 See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n, Enforcement Policy with Respect to Mergers in the
Food Distribution Industries, reprinted in 289 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) X-2 (Jan.
24, 1967), at X-3 [hereinafter Food Distribution Guidelines]. For years prior to these
industry guidelines the FTC had argued, unsuccessfully, that § 7 of the Clayton Act should
20051 1043
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corporations and transactions exceeding specified sizes. The FTC stated,
however, that this notification requirement did not impose a requirement
of Commission approval prior to consummating a merger.
2 2
B. DOJ: GENERAL GUIDANCE
Shortly after the FTC issued its first merger guidelines, DOJ issued its
own set of merger guidelines. 23 Those guidelines were generally applic-
able, not industry-specific, and were not meant to combat particular
merger waves. The legal standards set forth in the DOJ guidelines were
somewhat more permissive towards mergers than the Supreme Court
rulings of the time. Regardless of one's position on Von's Grocery, Pabst
Brewing, or even Brown Shoe, "it was clear that the [1968 Merger Guide-
lines] did not reflect these [decisions]" in the thresholds it established
for merger challenges. 24 The DOJ guidelines have, over time, been revised
rather than replaced; their format provided the foundation for the cur-
rent joint DOJ/FTC merger guidelines.
Some criticized the DOJ's approach, which was more general and
relied more overtly on economic theory compared to the FTC approach,
which was grounded in industry facts. For example, Commissioner Elman
stated: "To be most useful and meaningful, merger enforcement guide-
lines must be specific, concrete, and related to particular markets and
industries. If they merely indicate in a general way areas of concern to
the prosecuting agency, individual businessmen will still be in the dark as
to whether they may lawfully undertake particular mergers." 25 Similarly,
economist Lucille Shepard Keyes opined:
In addition to its inferiority with respect to the treatment of economic
benefits, a more general approach to the formulation of merger guide-
lines probably could not achieve the admirable clarity with which the
Commission has defined the precise applicability of its guidelines: there
may well be no very general way of specifying mergers with significant
have been amended to require premerger notification. See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N,
1963 ANNUAL REPORT 25.
22 Federal Trade Comm'n, Special Reports Relating to Large Corporate Mergers:
Requirements Concerning Notification and Submission, 37 Fed. Reg. 7951-52 (1972).
23 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1968), reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
4510 [hereinafter 1968 Merger Guidelines].
24 Thomas E. Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Of Collusion, Efficiency, and
Failure, 71 CAL. L. REv. 497, 507 n.23 (1983) (noting that the thresholds under which a
violation likely would not be found were higher in the guidelines than in the prevailing
Supreme Court rulings of the time).
25 Elman, The Need for Certainty, supra note 13, at 620.
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anticompetitive tendencies which would leave no major question as to
just who was forbidden to engage in just what transactions. 26
What such criticism underestimated, however, was the value the DOJ
guidelines offered through the more overt use of economics, as well as
the benefits to guidelines users of having a clear and broadly applicable
enforcement policy. Over time, reliance on the FTC guidelines declined.
Eventually, all of them were rescinded. 27 Meanwhile, the DOJ guidelines
slowly gained strength. 28
C. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF THE FTC
Various features of the FTC as an institution are reflected in the
contours of the agency's earliest guidelines, especially in comparison to
the DOJ and its own guidelines.
1. Expert and Study Function
Congress created the FTC as an expert body on competition policy.
Towards that end, the FTC's enabling legislation included powers, such
as the ability to undertake studies and draft reports.29 As one court
has noted, "Information gathered by the Commission under its broad
investigatory powers can be used for a variety of purposes, including
promulgation of new rules, reporting to Congress, disseminating eco-
nomic knowledge to the public, or ... to enable the Commission to
better administer the statutes over which it has jurisdiction." 30
Perhaps the most persistent theme sounded among the Commissioners
when these industry-specific guidelines were first introduced was to link
the FIC's role as an expert body to the agency's ability to provide
nonlitigation guidance. Elman implicitly criticized the DOJ's approach
to guidelines when he rejected the idea that an agency could merely draft
guidelines without having engaged in an "extended factual inquiry. ' 31
Though he wished "not to slight" the DOJ's ability to contribute within
this context, he noted that the DOJ "labors under the inherent handicap
26 Lucile Sheppard Keyes, The Merger Guidelines of the Department ofJustice, 2 (1) ANTITRUST
L. & ECON. REv. 77, 103 (1968).
27 The importance of the industry-specific guidelines was diminished by the growth in
influence of the DOJ guidelines, the passage of HSR (which somewhat mooted the pre-
merger notification elements of the industry guidelines by imposing a premerger notifica-
tion requirement upon all mergers of a particular size, regardless of industry), and a
reduction in the number of mergers in the guideline-covered industries.
28 Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in
Antitrust Discourse (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
29 Federal Trade Commission Act §§ 6(b), (f), as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 46(b), (f).
30 Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368, 1375 (9th Cir. 1978).
31 Elman, The Need for Certainty, supra note 13, at 624.
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of being primarily a prosecuting agency" and that any guidelines the
DOJ generated likely would be unable to provide "the whole answer to
the need for certainty."
32
The FTC's first guidelines emerged from the agency's extensive experi-
ence handling cement merger cases, followed by a study conducted by
FTC economists; the study resulted in a report33 that became the focus
of public hearings.34 The FTC then promulgated guidelines to reflect
the information it had gathered in all of these settings. The fact-specific
manner in which the FTC undertook promulgation of the cement indus-
try guidelines exemplified the agency's institutional mandate. However,
the FTC's guideline promulgation process drifted, at times significantly,
from that benchmark.
The second set of guidelines promulgated, pertaining to the food
distribution industries, were based not only upon the FTC's own knowl-
edge gleaned from its litigation experience and its survey of leading
food distributors, but also on "authoritative studies of others." 35 Similarly,
the FTC relied upon a combination of external and internal information
sources for the related set of guidelines pertaining to grocery products
manufacturing.36
The FTC's next set of guidelines, which applied to the textile mill
products industry, were not preceded by any hearings or formal study.
37
Commissioner Mary GardinerJones dissented from the textile guidelines
on this basis and wrote, "[M] erger guidelines should not be issued unless
a marshalling and evaluation of available industry facts and expert opin-
32 Id. at 619.
33 FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, STAFF REPORT, ECONOMIC REPORT ON MERGERS AND VERTI-
CAL INTEGRATION IN THE CEMENT INDUSTRY (1966).
34 Federal Trade Comm'n, Vertical Integration in Cement Industry: Notice of Public
Hearing, 31 Fed. Reg. 7772 (1966) [hereinafter Cement Hearing Notice].
11 Food Distribution Guidelines, supra note 21, at X-2.
36 Federal Trade Comm'n, Enforcement Policy with Respect to Product Extension Merg-
ers in Grocery Products Manufacturing, reprinted in 358 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
X-1 (May 21, 1968). See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON FOOD MARKETING, THE STRUCTURE OF
FOOD MANUFACTURING, TECHNICAL STUDY No. 8 (June 1966) (a study prepared by FTC
staff for the National Commission on Food Marketing.).
37 Federal Trade Comm'n, Enforcement Policy with Respect to Mergers in the Textile
Mill Products Industry, reprinted in 385 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) X-1 (Nov. 26,
1968) [hereinafter Textile Guidelines]. The guidelines did, however, have a factual basis.
Sources cited by the guidelines included: FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, MERGER MOVEMENT,
A SUMMARY REPORT (1948); basic statistics regarding textile mill products acquisition
compiled by the FTC's Bureau of Economics; and FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N & SECURITIES
EXCHANGE COMM'N, QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORT FOR MANUFACTURING CORP., FOURTH
QUARTER (1967). Textile Guidelines, supra.
[Vol. 721046
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ion has taken place either through a record in an adjudicatory proceed-
ing or in a public hearing." 38
The agency's final industry-specific merger enforcement guidelines
issued during this time pertained to the dairy industry. The factual
specificity of these guidelines was limited to the identification of acquisi-
tions that might warrant investigation. The guidelines contained no
references to any studies (conducted by the FTC or others) or to public
input (from hearings or comments). 39 Nonetheless, the FTC had consid-
erable insight into the industry, based on many previous investigations.
In fact, the agency viewed the expiration of several FTC orders restrain-
ing the largest national dairies as the source of the renewed threat of
mergers "ruinous to the dairy industry." Smaller, but still potentially
suspect, acquisitions were to be evaluated under the DOJ's 1968 mer-
ger guidelines.40
Although they were the least factually specific of all the industry-
based guidelines, even the dairy guidelines illustrated that when a policy
statement's value derives from its fact-specificity, the statement must
remain current. The dairy guidelines were issued in July 1973. However,
inflationary pressures in subsequent years led the agency to issue revised
guidelines in 1978 that more accurately reflected the agency's enforce-
ment intentions. The new guidelines incorporated a volume figure for
class I milk, rather than a sales figure, to act as both a reporting threshold
and a substantive trigger for agency investigation. 4' The implications of
this change were twofold. First, the change demonstrated that industries
in a state of flux are least likely to benefit from fact-specific guidance.
Second, if-or when-an industry subject to guidelines does change,
the guidelines must be revised or abandoned as necessary. Collectively,
these factors suggest that only particular types of industries would be
amenable to fact-specific guidelines.
2. Dual Role as Prosecutor and Adjudicator
Another defining feature of the FTC, relative to the DOJ, is its role
as an adjudicatory body as well as an enforcement agency. This dual
38 Textile Guidelines, supra note 37, at X-16. In addition to their insufficient substantive
basis, Commissioner Jones also based her dissent upon the fact that it was "manifestly
unfair" for the Commission to adopt guidelines while simultaneously accepting a consent
order against Burlington Industries that effectively legalized the same acquisitions that
are "clearly contrary to the guidelines." Id.
39 Federal Trade Comm'n, Enforcement Policy with Respect to Mergers in the Dairy
Industry, 43 Fed. Reg. 1992 (1978).
40 Id.
41 Id.
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role has been the source of various logistical complexities and resulting
criticisms, in several different contexts. 42 The guidelines context is no
exception.
No clear consensus existed among the Commissioners as to the treat-
ment of industry-specific guidelines during subsequent FTC adjudicatory
proceedings. 43 Chairman Dixon, for example, said that "official notice"
would be taken of the record amassed during the rulemaking proceed-
ing,44 while Commissioner Everette MacIntyre stated that "the adjudica-
tive proceeding initiated to enforce the rule would be greatly simplified
since the only factual issue to be adjudicated would be whether the rule
had been violated." 45 On a practical level, if the Commission had adopted
certain industry facts in a set of guidelines, reasonable litigants probably
would treat those facts as likely to be "found" in subsequent trials before
the administrative lawjudges and the Commission itself. Thus, fact-based
guidance conceivably would be more effective when issued by the FTC,
as opposed to the DOJ, which had only an enforcement role.
The FTC guidelines' strength-their specificity-also exposed the
Commission to charges of prejudgment. A combination of the ter-
minology "trade regulation rule proceeding" to describe guideline pro-
mulgation, 46 coupled with the ostensibly outcome-specific nature of the
guidelines, led to numerous and repeated due process challenges by
those subject to prosecution under the newly formulated enforcement
policies. Their constitutional arguments were: first, that the FTC had no
authority to promulgate antitrust trade regulation rules; and second,
that such impermissible rulemaking violated the due process right to a
fair trial. 47
These arguments were unsuccessful. The courts and the FTC alike
rejected those challenges, ruling that the FTC was not engaged in rule-
making when it promulgated its guidelines, and that the agency's "broad
investigatory powers" encompassed the ability to conduct hearings and
draft policy statements. 41 In a unanimous ruling, the Commissionjustified
its conduct as follows:
42 See, e.g., Philip Elman, A Note on Administrative Adjudication, 74 YALE L.J. 652 (1964-65).
43 Bernie R. Burrus & Harry Teter, Antitrust: Rulemaking v. Adjudication in the FTC, 54
GEo. L.J. 1106, 1110-18 (1966).
41 Id. at 1111.
45 Id. at 1112.
46 See infta text accompanying notes 50-53.
47 Ash Grove Cement Co., FTC Docket No. 8785, Respondent's Answer at 7-8 (Aug.
29, 1969).
48 Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368, 1375 (9th Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 721048
AGENCY GUIDELINES
If the Commission's expertise has been enlarged as a result of the gen-
eral inquiry conducted by it in connection with formulating the
Statement of Enforcement Policy, that fact neither prejudices the
respondents' rights nor constitutes any reason for dismissing these
proceedings. Respondents are entitled to have their cases adjudicated
by Commissioners with open minds, not empty ones.49
3. Historical and Political Context
The FTC amended its Rules of Practice to permit promulgation of
trade regulation rules in 1962. When the FTC first undertook the develop-
ment of its industry guidelines, the agency described its activities as trade
regulation rule proceedings. 50 Both the ability and wisdom of the FTC
to engage in rulemaking, particularly in the antitrust arena, was extremely
controversial." The FTC's proceedings culminated in the release of
guidelines styled as "Statements of Enforcement Policy." Commissioner
Elman explained the relationship between rules and guidelines as fol-
lows: while rules often denote "an absolute and inflexible prescription
of conduct," they also can be "more in the nature of standards, guidelines,
pointers .... -52 The FTC's "statements of enforcement policy" were in
the latter category. 53
In 1967, then-Chairman Dixon gave a speech entitled, "Program Plan-
ning at the Federal Trade Commission." In it, he acknowledged the
longstanding criticism of the FTC for failing to more rationally plan its
enforcement programs.54 Dixon then highlighted the merger guidelines
as a primary example of agency efforts to address the critics. 5  He also
discussed how Commission action in establishing merger guidelines was
not a "capricious, overnight policy change," but rather it was based upon
years of agency litigation and study. 56 In so doing, Dixon concurrently
4 Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 71 F.T.C. 1618, 1620-21 (1967).
o See, e.g, Cement Hearing Notice, supra note 34.
51 Glen E. Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission: Decline of Caveat
Emptor, 24 FED. B.J. 548, 569-72 (1964).
52 Elman, Rulemaking Procedures, supra note 10, at 385.
53 Id.
4 Paul Rand Dixon, Program Planning at the Federal Trade Commission, Remarks
Before Washington Conference on Business-Government Relations 1 (Apr. 18, 1967).
See alsoJames T. Halverson, Whatever Happened to the Little Old Lady of Pennsylvania
Avenue, Speech Before the Association of General Counsel, reprinted in 634 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) D-1 (Oct. 16, 1973) (FTC Bureau of Competition Director noting
that, "In report after report on the operations of the Federal Trade Commission since its
birth in 1914... the Commission has been criticized for its proclivity to expend resources
... on 'trivial' cases.").
55 Dixon, supra note 54, at 7.
16 Id. at 8-9.
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demonstrated a coherent policy to deal with future problems as well as
justified prior agency actions.
The severity and significance of criticism directed towards the FTC
during this time cannot be overstated. One report, issued by the Ameri-
can Bar Association in 1969, stated in no uncertain terms, "Further
temporizing is indefensible. Notwithstanding the great potential for the
FTC in the field of antitrust and consumer protection, if change does not
occur there will be no substantial purpose to be served by its continued
existence. ."... ,57 It is worth noting, however, that a number of the reports
evaluating the FTC written during the 1960s frequently identified the
"new" policy of tool of guidelines as "very promising."5 s Even Nader's
highly critical report of the FTC stated, "We think guidelines and rule-
making represent the Agency's most effective institutional approach"
because they are "so uniquely suited to the FTC's theoretical expertise." 59
IV. GENERAL GUIDELINES
In 1982 the FTC introduced a new set of guidelines entitled, "Merger
Statement Regarding Horizontal Mergers."6 0 These generally applicable
guidelines, which were reminiscent in format to the DOJ's 1968 guide-
lines, were less detailed than the new merger guidelines issued contempo-
raneously by the DOJ.51
A. FTC's MERGER STATEMENT VERSUS DOJ's MERGER GUIDELINES
While the two sets of guidelines reflected a similar economic perspec-
tive, several differences were apparent. The primary difference was that
the FTC Statement was worded more broadly and was less obviously
based on particular economic theories. Tom Campbell, then the Director
of the FTC's Bureau of Competition, offered the following explanation:
"The clarity and statement of economic principles which we find in the
51 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ED-
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969); EDWARD F. COX ET. AL., THE NADER REPORT ON THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969) [hereinafter NADER REPORT].
5 Carl Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure, 48
MINN. L. REv. 383, 455 (1964) (advocated amending the FTC and Clayton Acts to give
the Commission "express authority to issue substantive rules and regulations to carry out
the provisions of these acts").
53 NADER REPORT, supra note 57, at 380.
0 Federal Trade Comm'n, FTC Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers (1982),
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,200 [hereinafter 1982 Merger Statement].
61 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1982), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,102 (hereinafter 1982 Merger Guidelines].
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[DOJ] Merger Guidelines are capable of misuse as well as of profitable
employment. ... [There are] economic talismans, [and] the FTC's
approach is to avoid [their use] . 62 Among the most symbolic examples
of the DOJ's reliance on economics was the complete omission of any
reference to the political or social goals of antitrust. By contrast, in its
1982 Merger Statement the FTC recognized that Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, "while primarily focusing on competitive considerations, also
reflected Congress' concern about the overall social and political ramifi-
cations of economic concentration attributable to merger activity." 6
The guidelines' differing approaches to concentration measures exem-
plified their more fundamental differences. Prior to 1982, market con-
centration had been measured almost exclusively in terms of
concentration ratios (the percentage of the market occupied by the two,
four, or eight largest firms). While this could be a useful measure,
dissatisfaction with its adequacy had been growing steadily. In its 1982
Guidelines, the DOJ adopted the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI)
for measuring concentration and prescribed very specific thresholds for
likely enforcement action-thresholds that, technically, persist today.64
By contrast, the FTC's 1982 Statement merely acknowledged the need
for further refinement of concentration assessments. While the FTC
mentioned HHI as one possible concentration measure, the FTC State-
ment did not endorse HHIs, nor did it propose any specific concentra-
tion thresholds. 65
B. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF THE FTC
The FTC switched to general merger guidelines, but the FTC's guide-
lines were less specific than those of the DOJ. Here, as in the earlier
examples regarding industry-specific guidelines, several institutional fea-
tures of the FTC likely contributed to the nature of its guidelines.
1. Dual Role as Adjudicator and Prosecutor
Although the FTC eventually prevailed in its earlier battles over poten-
tial prejudgment and the industry guidelines, 66 the prejudgment issue
62 Thomas J. Campbell, New Merger Guidelines: A Federal Trade Commission Perspective, 51
ANTITRUST LJ. 295, 297 (1982).
63 1982 Merger Statement, supra note 60, at Introduction.
64 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 61, at Part III(A)(1).
65 1982 Merger Statement, supra note 60, at Part II. The FTC also stated, however, that
the DOJ's 1982 Guidelines "[would] be given considerable weight by the Commission and
its staff." Id. at Part I.
6 See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
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may have contributed to the FTC Statement's level of generality. FTC
Bureau Director Campbell remarked at the time:
Judges are not inclined to state in advance what aspects they will consider
important; one must learn that through our process case by case. This,
I believe explains the reluctance of specificity in the FTC Statement.
... I am not sure I would have wanted a more specific statement. ....
I do not believe it is a disservice to American industry or to the bar to
allow for case-by-case determinations.
67
While Commissioners may constrain themselves when writing guidelines,
those Commissioners, when sitting as judges, can elaborate upon or
clarify the guidelines in their opinions. Throughout the 1980s the Com-
missioners used their rulings to provide further guidance, an option
clearly unavailable to their DOJ cotinterparts.
61
The Commission's dual role informed not only the guidelines' general
tenor, but also specific provisions. For example, the Statement provided
that the Commission's reliance upon evidence regarding efficiencies or
the failing firm defense would be limited to the Commission's exercise
of its prosecutorial discretion. 69 Stated alternatively, the Commission would
not treat either factor as a legally cognizable defense. The Commission
rejected the efficiency defense because of the extensive "analytical ambi-
guities" involved and the failing firm defense because of "difficulties of
proof."70 In so doing, the Commission accounted for the challenges it
faced as an adjudicator.
2. Agency Structure
Another defining feature of the FTC is its organizational structure.
The Commission's design itself enhances the likelihood of diverse views
on aspects of antitrust law that are not clear-cut. The FTC is run by a
five-member Commission, where no more than three of the five Commis-
sioners may be from the same political party. Each Commissioner is
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate for staggered
seven-year terms. Therefore, at any given time, the Commission also is
likely to be composed of appointees from more than one Presidential
administration.
Even assuming general agreement among Commissioners about the
value of merger guidelines, one would expect a level of compromise in
67 Campbell, supra note 62, at 296-97.
68 See, e.g.,Jeffrey I. Zuckerman, The FTC's Approach to Merger Analysis: Is Anyone Out There
Paying Attention?, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 115, 116 (1988).
69 1982 Merger Statement, supra note 60, Parts IV-V.
70 Id.
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an FTC document that would be unnecessary in its DOJ counterpart.
Such compromises would most likely manifest themselves in a more
flexible document that encompassed a wider range of possibilities. The
FTC Statement essentially begins with explicit recognition of such a
compromise: "While the Commission supports the Department of Jus-
tice's decision to revise the 1968 Guidelines, individual Commissioners,
however, may not endorse each specific revision that has been pro-
posed."'" For example, Chairman James Miller's support for the failing
division defense is relegated to a footnote in the guidelines. 72
Certain agency differences pertaining to merger remedies also have
been attributed to their respective institutional structures. 73 Fix-it-first
remedies are structural remedies implemented before merger consum-
mation. The DOJ embraces such remedies whereas the FTC eschews
them. Their preferences arguably reflect the relative ease with which each
agency can pursue each type of remedy. 74 In terms of FTC's reluctance to
use fix-it-first, some have argued that "[t] he decentralized and indepen-
dent nature of the FTC's decision-making apparatus is not particularly
conducive to back-and-forth negotiation. The discussion and negotiation
required to implement a fix-it-first remedy may be more difficult to
achieve in this environment than at DOJ, which has a single decision
maker." 75
C. JOINT GUIDELINES
Given the yearning for predictability underlying the antitrust guide-
lines, it is not surprising that the agencies ultimately came together to
issue joint guidance. The fact that an agency's institutional character
influences the guidelines it promulgates is no less true when the guide-
lines result fromjoint agency efforts, although now the agencies' imprints
71 Id. at Part I n.1.
72 Miller advocated recognition of a failing division defense (which the FIC Statement
did not recognize). Id. at Part V n.26.
73 Agency differences regarding remedies persist despite their issuance of joint merger
guidelines. See supra Part IV.C.
74 Logan M. Breed & David J. Michnal, Merger Remedies: The DOJ's New Guide to Old
Differences with the FTC, ANTITRUST, Spring 2005, at 37.
75 Id. at 38-39. As a further logistical matter, despite similar public notice and comment
requirements, the FTFC in its judicial capacity has the ability to grant final approval of a
consent agreement. By contrast, per the Tunney Act, a DOJ consent order is not final
until it is determined to be "in the public interest" by a district court judge. Id. at 38. But
see Deborah Platt Majoras, Looking Forward: Merger and Other Policy Initiatives at the
FTC, Remarks Before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law 7-9 (Nov. 18, 2004) (Chairman
Majoras argued that differences in approaches to remedies between the FTC and DOJ
are "overblown"), availableathttp://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/041118/abafallforum.
pdf.
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are collective. It is reasonable to conclude that the differences between
the two agencies lead to the FTC being a moderating influence, on
average. This moderation results, in part, from the fact that the FTC's
internal organization and incentives already will have caused the FTC's
position itself to be a product of compromise.7 6
Although general guidelines have dominated the merger landscape
for decades, their format has not evolved inexorably towards less industry-
specificity. The joint FTC/DOJ Statements of Enforcement Policy in
Health Care, first issued in 1993 and later revised, marked a limited
return to industry-specific guidelines. 77 For example, they established
"safety zones" for certain mergers78 and for various types of joint ven-
tures79 based on specific characteristics of the participants and transac-
tions in question. However, the Health Care Guidelines also relied heavily
upon the agencies' jointly issued guidelines regarding horizontal
mergers.
During their promulgation, the Health Care Guidelines did not appear
to benefit from the FTC's study function per se. However, these guide-
lines were written at a time when health care reform (especially the idea
of national health care plans) was a topic of national debate, and the
antitrust agencies likely incorporated information developed in the
course of that debate. Still, industry-specific guidelines have their draw-
backs: they often invoke calls for additional guidance; and they are more
likely to become outdated than general guidelines. In fact, two revisions
followed within three years after the 1993 guidelines were released.80
76 One possible exception to this relationship could result if the same conduct might
have criminal, as well as civil, consequences, in which case the DOJ's concerns regarding
its criminal jurisdiction (which the FTC does not share) could prompt the DOJ to act as
a more moderating influence. See Panel 1: Strategic Planning for Financial Institutions in a
New Legal and Economic Environment, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 23, 55-56 (2001)
(William T. Lifland noted that competitor collaborations that do not constitute mergers
could, in the extreme, result in either clearance or criminal prosecution).
7 U.S. Dep't ofJustice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement
Policy in Health Care (rev. 1996), reprinted in 41 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,153 [herein-
after Health Care Guidelines].
78 The Health Care Guidelines indicate that the agencies "will not challenge, absent
extraordinary circumstances, any merger between two general acute-care hospitals where
one of the hospitals (1) has an average of fewer than 100 licensed beds . . . and (2) has
an average daily inpatient census of fewer than 40 patients over the three most recent
years.... " Id. at Statement 1 (A).
79 The Health Care Guidelines indicate that the agencies "will not challenge, absent
extraordinary circumstances, an exclusive physician networkjoint venture whose physician
participants share substantial financial risk and constitute 20 percent or less of physicians
in each physician specialty." Id. at Statement 8(A)(1).
8 See generally id. at Introduction (discussing the 1994 and 1996 revisions in which the
agencies expanded and clarified their enforcement policies).
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Later, in 2002, then-FTC Chairman Timothy Muris launched a two-day
public workshop, "Health Care and Competition Law and Policy," to
examine a multitude of issues, including whether the Health Care Guide-
lines needed further updating.8' In 2003 the FTC, in conjunction with
the DOJ, conducted a lengthy set of public hearings to further the
dialogue and learning begun in the earlier workshop. Both the hearings
and the July 2004 report in which they culminated included a limited
review of the Health Care Guidelines. The report discussed several issues
covered in the guidelines-primarily geographic market definition and
the safety zone for joint purchasing arrangements-and concluded that
that the guidelines did not warrant revision. 82
Finally, it is important to recognize that the FTC's study function
continues to inform guidelines development. Under then-Chairman
Robert Pitofsky, the FTC held public hearings (beginning in October
1995) and subsequently published a report (in May 1996) examining the
impact of increasing globalization and rapid innovation on competition
policy. Based on testimony from many witnesses, the staff report argued
that "the evidentiary issues posed by efficiencies are difficult, but manage-
able."8 3 The report both offered substantive recommendations regarding
efficiencies and recommended creation of a joint FTC/DOJ task force
to determine whether or how the 1992 Merger Guidelines should be
changed.8 4 Pitofsky credited the report with having departed from "con-
ventional wisdom" of the time in a number of ways and with having
"accelerated and focused debate on the treatment of efficiencies in
merger enforcement. .".. ,,85 In 1997 the DOJ/ETC merger guidelines
were revised to include a section outlining treatment of efficiencies. 86
The globalization and competition hearings had a second guidelines
consequence. According to an "oft-told tale," at the end of those hearings
the FTC asked the participants what area of antitrust was most uncertain
and was leading to over-deterrence of otherwise procompetitive conduct.
81 Federal Trade Comm'n, Notice of Public Workshop and Opportunity for Comment,
67 Fed. Reg. 47,365-66 (2002).
82 U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE
OF COMPETITION 26-27 (2004).
83 FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, STAFF REPORT, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETI-
TION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE ch. 2 at 17 (1996).
84 Id. ch. 2 at 20-43.
85 Robert Pitofsky, FTC Staff Report on Competition Policy: Six Months After, Remarks
Before ABA Section of Antitrust Law 3 (Nov. 7, 1996).
86 U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992,
rev. 1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104, available at www.ftc.gov/bc/
docs/horizmer.htm.
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The law regarding joint ventures, and horizontal collaborations gener-
ally, was the primary response. To follow up, the FTC then conducted
further public hearings and roundtables on this issue.87 The FTC,joined
by the DOJ, subsequently drafted guidelines addressing this specific area
of law.88 Pitofsky stated that among the most "challenging" issues these
guidelines posed was the presentation of "a single analytical framework
that cuts across many types of agreements ... and cuts across indus-
tries."89 In so doing, the malleability of this policy tool was demonstrated
yet again.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the years, the FFC's guideline choices have reflected a number
of its special institutional features, ranging from the agency's study func-
tion, to its dual role, to its multi-member structure. These features of
agency character caused the FTC to issue separate guidelines that embod-
ied different choices from those issued by DOJ. While the FTC's early
industry-specific guidelines have since been rescinded, those guidelines
left us with some valuable lessons (some of which were quite relevant
to the relatively recent foray into health care guidelines), as well as
a legacy of premerger notification requirements that (in their HSR
manifestation) are now a critical foundation of U.S. merger policy. In
the current environment of predominantly joint FTC/DOJ guidelines,
the influence of the FTC's institutional features is now reflected more
subtly in the behind-the-scenes negotiation process. Agency guidelines
have become a staple of antitrust discourse. This policy tool will, no
doubt, continue to evolve. Ideally, the FTC and DOJ will find ways to
coordinate while still making unique contributions to the evolution of
antitrust guidelines.
87 Robert Pitofsky, Joint Venture Guidelines: Views from One of the Drafters, Remarks
Before ABA Section of Antitrust Law 1 (Nov. 11, 1999).
81 U.S. Dep't ofJustice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Guidelines for Collaborations Among
Competitors (2000), reprinted in4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,161, availableatwww.ftc.gov/
os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf. See also U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Antitrust Guide Concerning
Research Joint Ventures (1980), reprinted in 992 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) Spec.
Supp. (Dec. 4, 1980).
89 Pitofsky, supra note 87, at 3.
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